Investor Objective & Satisfaction

MFM Practitioner Module: Risk & Asset Allocation

John Dodson

February 4, 2015
Outline

Review

Motivation

Objectives
  Delta-Gamma

Satisfaction
  Properties
  Value-at-Risk
  Expected Shortfall
  Expected Utility
Meucci’s Program for Asset Allocation

- detect market invariance
  - select the invariants

- estimate the market
  - specify the distribution of the invariants
  - decide on approach to dealing with heteroskedasticity

- model the market
  - project the invariants to the horizon
  - map the invariants back to market prices

- define investor optimality
  - objective
  - satisfaction
  - constraints

- collect manager experience
  - prior on the market vector parameters

- determine optimal allocation
  - two-step approach
Evaluating Allocations

Modeling Preferences
Now that we have techniques for characterizing the market, $P_{T+\tau}$, we turn to models for investor satisfaction that will lead us into optimization. In the author’s fashion we will approach this implicitly by laying out properties that we should desire in a model for satisfaction.

Considerations
There are several risks to consider

- How do we calibrate such a model? A survey? *Homo economicus*?
- What if the investor changes his or her mind?
- Can we assume that the investor is willing to ignore short-term results?
Measuring Performance

Put yourself in the shoes of an investment manager faced with a potential client. The first thing you need to consider to make your case is, how will the client measure your performance?

Objective

- wealth?
- profit?
- profit relative to some benchmark portfolio?

We will represent the value of the objective at $T + \tau$ by the random variable $\Psi_\alpha$ where $\alpha$ represents the allocation that is implemented at $T$. 
Investor’s Objective

In all of the cases we will consider, we can write

$$\Psi_\alpha = \alpha'M$$ with $$M = a + BP_{T+\tau}$$

for constants $a$ and $B$

- **wealth**: $a = 0, \ B = I$
- **profit**: $a = -p_T, \ B = I$
- **relative profit**: $a = 0, \ B = I - \frac{p_T\beta'}{\beta'p_T}$ for benchmark portfolio allocation $\beta$

Therefore, the objective is both homogeneous and additive in the allocation.

$$\Psi_{\lambda\alpha} = \lambda\Psi_\alpha \quad \Psi_{\alpha+\beta} = \Psi_\alpha + \Psi_\beta$$

N.B.: None of our definitions of total return has these properties.
Delta-Gamma Approximation

We can extend our characterization of the market invariants to the market vector \( M = a + Bg(X) \).

Delta-Gamma Approximation

If we can approximate the market invariants by \( X \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \Sigma) \) and the map, \( g \), by an order-two polynomial, then there is an analytic characterization of the investor’s objective.

\[
\phi_{\psi_\alpha}(t) \approx \left| I - it \Gamma_\alpha \Sigma \right|^{-\frac{1}{2}} e^{it \left( \Theta_\alpha + \Delta'_\alpha \mu + \frac{1}{2} \mu' \Gamma_\alpha \mu \right)} e^{-\frac{1}{2} t^2 (\Delta_\alpha + \Gamma_\alpha \mu)' \Sigma (I - it \Gamma_\alpha \Sigma)^{-1} (\Delta_\alpha + \Gamma_\alpha \mu)}
\]

where

\[
\Delta_\alpha = \alpha' B \frac{\partial g}{\partial X}(0) \quad \Theta_\alpha = \alpha' (a + Bg(0))
\]

\[
\Gamma_\alpha = \alpha' B \frac{\partial^2 g}{\partial X \partial X'}(0)
\]
Index of Satisfaction

The investor’s objective for a given allocation, $\Psi_{\alpha}$, is a scalar quantity that provides a clear ordinal ranking of outcomes at time $T + \tau$. Since it is random today at time $T$, we can characterize it, but we cannot use it to rank potential allocations. To do this, we will introduce an operator $S$, that transforms the characterization of the investor’s objective into a scalar measuring the investor’s satisfaction with a potential allocation today at time $T$.

Illustration
For example, it is not unreasonable to consider

$$S(\alpha) = E\Psi_{\alpha} = \alpha' E(M)$$

today’s expected value of the investor’s objective.

Before proceeding with this choice, let us lay out a “wish list” of properties that we would like such an operator to possess.
Coherent Properties

The goal of the satisfaction operator, $\alpha \mapsto S(\alpha)$, is to rank allocations. Let us preview some possible qualities.

- money-equivalent $S(\alpha)$ and $\Psi_\alpha$ are in the same units
- estimable $S(\alpha)$ is non-random
- sensible $P\{\Psi_\alpha \geq \Psi_\beta\} = 1 \Rightarrow S(\alpha) \geq S(\beta)$
- constant $P\{\Psi_b = \psi_b\} = 1 \Rightarrow S(b) = \psi_b$
- positive homogeneous $\lambda \geq 0 \Rightarrow S(\lambda \alpha) = \lambda S(\alpha)$
- translation invariant $S(\alpha + b) = S(\alpha) + \psi_b$
- super-additive $S(\alpha + \beta) \geq S(\alpha) + S(\beta)$
- co-monotonic additive $h(\cdot)$ invertible, increasing $\Psi_\beta = h(\Psi_\alpha) \Rightarrow S(\alpha + \beta) = S(\alpha) + S(\beta)$
- concave $0 \leq \lambda \leq 1 \Rightarrow S(\lambda \alpha + (1 - \lambda)\beta) \geq \lambda S(\alpha) + (1 - \lambda)S(\beta)$
- risk averse $E \Psi_f = 0 \Rightarrow S(f + b) \leq S(b)$
Coherent Properties

Discussion

▸ Constancy, translation invariance, and risk aversion all refer to the role of cash in the portfolio.

▸ Risk aversion says that the investor should prefer cash to any risky portfolio with the same expected outcome.

▸ Super-additivity and concavity both refer to the investor’s preference for diversification.

▸ Co-monotonic additivity means that derivatives or leverage in the portfolio provide no diversification benefit relative to underlyings (for known implied vol).

▸ Positive homogeneity mean that the satisfaction can be decomposed into the sum of marginal satisfactions.

\[ S(\alpha) = \alpha' \frac{\partial S}{\partial \alpha'} = \sum_i \alpha_i \frac{\partial S}{\partial \alpha_i} \]
Coherent Properties

Quasi-Concavity

Any concave index of satisfaction is also quasi-concave, which means that

\[ S(\lambda \alpha + (1 - \lambda) \beta) \geq \min (S(\alpha), S(\beta)) \quad \forall \quad 0 < \lambda < 1 \]

The converse is not true in general; but in fact quasi-concavity is sufficient to express the preference for diversification. To see this, consider an incumbent portfolio \( \alpha \) and any candidate portfolio \( \beta \) with \( S(\beta) \geq S(\alpha) \) with quasi-concave satisfaction \( S(\cdot) \). The definition leads us to conclude that for any \( 0 < \lambda < 1 \), \( S(\gamma) \geq S(\alpha) \) where

\[ \gamma = \lambda \alpha + (1 - \lambda) \beta \]

That is, no convex combination of the incumbent and candidate portfolio is inferior to the incumbent.
Value-at-Risk

Value-at-Risk (VaR), a term and concept introduced by J. P. Morgan in the 1990’s and popularized by the Basle Committee as a certified measure of the risk in banks’ trading books.

\[ S(\alpha) = Q_{\psi \alpha} (1 - c) \]

where the confidence level, \( c \), is usually 0.95 or 0.99.

Properties

Value-at-Risk has many properties that make it a candidate for an index of satisfaction, except

- not super-additive
- not concave
- not risk averse

Value-at-risk can be challenged by diversification. For example, a portfolio of defaultable bonds could have a lower satisfaction than a single defaultable bond.
Value-at-Risk

When it was first introduced by J. P. Morgan, it was argued that $M \sim \mathcal{N}(\mu, \Sigma)$ was an adequate description of risk in the market. We can recover a simple expression for the marginal decomposition in this setting.

$$\text{VaR}_c(\alpha) = Q_{\psi_\alpha}(1 - c) = \alpha' \left( \mu - \sqrt{2} \text{erf}^{-1}(2c - 1) \frac{\Sigma \alpha}{\sqrt{\alpha' \Sigma \alpha}} \right)$$

A similar result holds generally.

$$Q_{\psi_\alpha}(1 - c) = \alpha' \mathbb{E} \left( M \mid \{ \alpha' M = Q_{\psi_\alpha}(1 - c) \} \right)$$

It is easy to interpret this in a simulation setting.

1. sample the market vector $N$ times and evaluate the objective in each
2. sort them in descending order and isolate a range of results around $c \times N$
3. the marginal value-at-risk for each position is the average in this range of the contribution
Beyond the normal approximation proposed by J. P. Morgan, the next most useful approximation to the quantile measure of satisfaction come from the Cornish-Fisher expansion.

**Cornish-Fisher Expansion**

In general,

\[ Q_{\Psi_{\alpha}}(1 - c) = E(\Psi_{\alpha}) \]

\[ - Sd(\Psi_{\alpha}) \left( z_1(c) - \frac{z_2(c) - 1}{6} Sk(\Psi_{\alpha}) \right) + \cdots \]

where \( z_1(c) = \sqrt{2} \text{erf}^{-1}(2c - 1) \) and \( z_2(c) = z_1(c)^2 \).

In practice, the moments of \( \Psi_{\alpha} \) can be evaluated from the Delta-Gamma approximation (\( * \)).
Expected Shortfall

The fact that quantile-based satisfaction can be challenged by diversification has led to a modified definition, expected shortfall or conditional value-at-risk.

$$\text{ES}_c(\alpha) = \frac{1}{1-c} \int_0^{1-c} Q_{\Psi\alpha}(p) \, dp$$

**Spectral Index of Satisfaction**

This is a special case of a more general definition,

$$S(\alpha) = \int_0^1 \phi(p) Q_{\Psi\alpha}(p) \, dp$$

for the spectrum, $\phi(\cdot)$, a decreasing function with $\int_0^1 \phi(p) \, dp = 1$ and $\phi(1) = 0$.

- Spectral satisfaction is super-additive, concave, and risk averse.
Expected Shortfall

The marginal decomposition is also similar to that of value-at-risk.

\[
ES_c(\alpha) = \alpha' E \left( M \left| \{ \alpha' M \leq Q_{\psi_\alpha}(1 - c) \} \right. \right)
\]

It is also subject to the same Cornish-Fisher expansion, with the replacement

\[
\tilde{z}_1(c) = \frac{1}{1 - c} \int_c^1 z(p) \, dp
\]

\[
\tilde{z}_2(c) = \frac{1}{1 - c} \int_c^1 z(p)^2 \, dp
\]

Contrasting

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$c$</th>
<th>$z_1(c)$</th>
<th>$z_2(c)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>1.65</td>
<td>2.71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>2.33</td>
<td>5.41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$c$</th>
<th>$\tilde{z}_1(c)$</th>
<th>$\tilde{z}_2(c)$</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>4.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.99</td>
<td>2.67</td>
<td>7.20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

we see that expected shortfall is more sensitive to skewness in the objective than value-at-risk.
Dual Representation

An alternate representation of expected shortfall is
\[ ES_c(\alpha) = \sup_q \left( q - \frac{1}{1 - c} E (q - \psi_\alpha)^+ \right) \]

and, in fact, the optimum value of the argument above is
\[ \text{VaR}_c(\alpha) = q^* \]

- It is reasonable that
\[ ES_c(\alpha) = \text{VaR}_c(\alpha) - \frac{E (\text{VaR}_c(\alpha) - \psi_\alpha)^+}{\Pr \{ \psi_\alpha < \text{VaR}_c(\alpha) \}} \]

- But the presence of the sup in the dual representation is a striking and potentially practical feature.
Expected Utility

A more traditional approach to defining investor satisfaction is to build an index of satisfaction based on utility, which is an economist’s approach to specifying preferences.

Certainty-Equivalent

We want our measure of investor satisfaction to be denominated in currency, while utility, \( u(\psi) \), is denominated in “utils.” To resolve this, we can apply the inverse of utility to get back to units of the investor’s objective.

\[
\text{CE}(\alpha) = u^{-1}(E u(\Psi_\alpha))
\]

Coherent Properties

Few general claims can be made. The power utility exhibits positive homogeneity and the exponential utility exhibits translation invariance. Generally,

- not super-additive, co-monotonic additive, or concave
Pearson Family

A useful three-parameter family of utility functions is given by the ordinary differential equation,

$$\frac{u''(\psi)}{u'(\psi)} = \frac{\psi}{\gamma \psi^2 + \zeta \psi + \eta}$$

This includes the following classes

- **quadratic** (CAPM) \( u(\psi) = \psi - \frac{1}{2\zeta} \psi^2 \) for \( \psi < \zeta \)
- **log** (Kelly) \( u(\psi) = \log \psi \) for \( \psi > 0 \)
- **power** \( u(\psi) = \psi^{1-\frac{1}{\gamma}} \) for \( \psi > 0 \)
- **exponential** \( u(\psi) = -e^{-\frac{\psi}{\zeta}} \)
- **sigmoid** (prospect theory) \( u(\psi) = \text{erf} \frac{\psi}{\sqrt{2\eta}} \)

Note that power and log utilities are only sensible if the support for the investor’s objective is bounded below, and the quadratic utility is only sensible if the support for the investor’s objective is *bounded above.*
Arrow-Pratt Approximation

A power series expansion of the utility provides a useful approximation to the certainty-equivalent.

\[ \text{CE}(\alpha) \approx \mathbb{E}[\Psi_\alpha] + \frac{u''(\mathbb{E}[\Psi_\alpha])}{2u'(\mathbb{E}[\Psi_\alpha])} \text{var } \Psi_\alpha \]

This approximation is exact if the market vector is normal and the utility is exponential.

Risk Aversion

The certainty-equivalent satisfaction is invariant under changes of utility units. This motivates the definition of the Arrow-Pratt (absolute) risk aversion,

\[ A(\psi) = -\frac{u''(\psi)}{u'(\psi)} \]

To the extent that this is constant near the mean, the Arrow-Pratt approximation is quadratic in the allocation.
Prospect theory comes from psychological rather than traditional economic considerations. It is an example of behavioral economics.

- Properly, the investor’s objective is relative (either profit or profit relative to some benchmark)
- The investor becomes increasingly risk-averse with cumulative gains, but
- The investor becomes increasingly risk-seeking with cumulative losses

The Arrow-Pratt approximation for the certainty-equivalent satisfaction under the prospect theory utility is

\[ CE(\alpha) \approx E\psi_\alpha \left( 1 - \frac{1}{2\eta} \text{var} \psi_\alpha \right) \]
Recalling the dual representation, based on convex conjugation, we can see that there is a utility function for expected shortfall.

\[ u(\psi; q) = q - \frac{1}{1 - c} (q - \psi)^+ \]

Here, we expand the optimization choice variable set (usually the components of \( \alpha \)) to include the value-at-risk level, \( q \).

- If there is a value-at-risk constraint, then this representation is particularly useful.

Note that this is a proper utility function: increasing and concave down; but it is not a member of the Pearson family.