

(67) EXAMPLES: let's compute orders in $(\mathbb{Z}/3\mathbb{Z})^\times \times (\mathbb{Z}/5\mathbb{Z})^\times$:

<u>$(\bar{a}, 5)$</u>	<u>$\text{ord } (\bar{a}, 5)$</u>
$(\bar{1}, \bar{1})$	1
$(\bar{1}, \bar{2})$	4
$(\bar{1}, \bar{3})$	4
$(\bar{1}, \bar{4})$	2
$(\bar{2}, \bar{1})$	2
$(\bar{2}, \bar{2})$	4
$(\bar{2}, \bar{3})$	4
$(\bar{2}, \bar{4})$	2
$(\bar{1}, \bar{1}) = (\bar{2}, \bar{4})$	2

looks similar to $(\mathbb{Z}/15\mathbb{Z})^\times$? Not a coincidence...

Sun Ze's Theorem ("Chinese Remainder Thm")
 ↗ 3rd century AD?
 (PROP 2.11.3 + more)

Given m, n [with $\gcd(m, n) = 1$] the map

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z} & \xrightarrow{f} & \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \\ \xrightarrow{\quad \bar{a} \quad} & & \xrightarrow{\quad (\bar{a} \pmod m, \bar{a} \pmod n) \quad} \end{array}$$

is well-defined, a bijection, and respects both $+$ and \times ,
 so that it gives group isomorphisms

$$(\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^+ \cong (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^+ \times (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^+$$

$$\text{and } (\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^\times \cong (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^\times \times (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^\times$$

10/12/2018 > proof: Well-defined-ness of f comes from $\bar{a} = \bar{a}'$ in $\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z}$

$$\begin{aligned} \Rightarrow a - a' &\in mn\mathbb{Z} \\ \Rightarrow a - a' &\in m\mathbb{Z}, n\mathbb{Z} \\ \Rightarrow \bar{a} = \bar{a}' &\text{ in } \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} \\ \bar{a} = \bar{a}' &\text{ in } \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \end{aligned}$$

Respecting $+$, \times comes from their componentwise def'n on right.
 Bijectivity of f comes from an explicit inverse map g , that comes
 from picking any $x, y \in \mathbb{Z}$ with $xm + yn = 1$ (since $\gcd(m, n) = 1$).

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$$\text{This let's one define } \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z} \xrightarrow{g} \mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z}$$

$$(\bar{c}, \bar{d}) \mapsto \frac{\bar{y}nc + \bar{x}nd}{\bar{y}nc + \bar{x}nd}$$

$$\text{and check } (f \circ g)(\bar{a}) = g((\bar{a}, \bar{a})) = \overline{yna + xna} = \overline{(yn+xm) \cdot a} = \bar{1} \cdot \bar{a} = \bar{a}$$

$$\text{and } (f \circ g)(\bar{c}, \bar{d}) = f(\overline{ync + xnd}) = (\overline{ync + xnd}, \overline{ync + xnd})$$

$$= (\overline{y} \bar{n} \bar{c}, \bar{x} \bar{n} \bar{d}) \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z} \times \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$$

$$\stackrel{\text{since } \bar{x} \bar{n} + \bar{y} \bar{n} = 1}{=} (\bar{1} \cdot \bar{c}, \bar{1} \cdot \bar{d}) = (\bar{c}, \bar{d})$$

$$\Rightarrow \bar{x}\bar{n} = \bar{1} \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$$

$$\bar{y}\bar{n} = \bar{1} \text{ in } \mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z}$$



There's an alternate way we might recognize $(\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^+ \cong (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^+ \times (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^+$, via a general product recognition result.

$$G = G_1 \times G_2 \text{ has 2 subgroups } H = G_1 \times \{1\}$$

$$K = \{1\} \times G_2$$

that (a) intersect in $\{1\}^{(1,1)} (= H \cap K)$

(b) commute with each other: $hk = kh \quad \forall h \in H, k \in K$ (since $(g_1, 1) \cdot (1, g_2) = (g_1, g_2) = (1, g_2) \cdot (1, g_2)$)

$$\text{and (c)} G = H \cdot K \text{ since } (g_1, g_2) = (g_1, 1) \cdot (1, g_2)$$

$$:= \{hk : h \in H, k \in K\}$$

$$= (g_1, g_2) \cdot (1, g_2)$$

$$= (1, g_2) \cdot (g_1, g_2)$$

That's all you need...

PROPOSITION: If a group G has two subgroups $H, K < G$, then the multiplication map $H \times K \xrightarrow{\mu} G$

$$(h, k) \mapsto hk$$

is an isomorphism of groups $\iff \begin{cases} (a) H \cap K = \{1\} \\ (b) H, K \text{ commute, i.e. } hk = kh \quad \forall h \in H, k \in K \\ (c) HK = G \end{cases}$

proof: Check μ is injective $\iff (a) H \cap K = \{1\}$: If μ is injective then any $g \in H \cap K$ has $\mu(g, g^{-1}) = g \cdot g^{-1} = 1 = \mu(1, 1)$ forcing $g = 1$, i.e. $H \cap K = \{1\}$

$$\text{If } H \cap K = \{1\} \text{ and } \mu(h, k) = 1 \text{ then } hk = 1$$

$$\Rightarrow h = k^{-1} \in K$$

$$\Rightarrow h \in H \cap K \Rightarrow h = 1$$

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Check μ is a group homomorphism \Leftrightarrow (b) H, K commute

$$\begin{aligned} \mu((h_1, k_1)(h_2, k_2)) &= \mu(h_1, k_1) \mu(h_2, k_2) \quad \forall h_i \in H \\ &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mu(h_1 h_2, k_1 k_2) \quad \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} h_1 k_1 \cdot h_2 k_2 \\ &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} h_1 h_2 k_1 k_2 \end{aligned}$$

$\Leftrightarrow h_1 h_2 k_1 k_2 = h_1 k_1 h_2 k_2 \quad \text{mult. on left by } h_1^{-1}, \text{ on right by } k_2^{-1}$

$\Leftrightarrow h_2 k_1 = k_1 h_2 \quad \forall k_i \in K, h_i \in H \quad \text{i.e. H, K commute.}$

Lastly, μ is surjective \Leftrightarrow (c) $G = HK$ since $HK = \text{im}(\mu)$. \blacksquare

This proposition ^{almost} applies to $(\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^+ = G$ if $\gcd(m, n) = 1$
 with subgroups $H = (\mathbb{Z}/m\mathbb{Z})^+ \cong$ multiples of \bar{m} inside $(\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^+$
 $K = (\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z})^+ \cong$ multiples of \bar{n} inside $(\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^+$

Q: Why is $HK = \{1\}$ ($= \{0\}$)?

Why do H, K commute?

($G = H + K$ is less obvious, but can note both $(\mathbb{Z}/mn\mathbb{Z})^+$,
 and $H \times K$ have
same cardinality mn ,
 so the injective homomorphism μ
must also be surjective). \square

REMARK:

Note that one can use Sylow's Thm. and induction on k to prove

if ~~(m_1, m_2, \dots, m_k)~~ have $\gcd(m_i, m_j) = 1 \quad \forall i \neq j$ then

$$\begin{aligned} \mathbb{Z}/m_1 m_2 \cdots m_k \mathbb{Z} &\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}/m_1 \mathbb{Z} \times \cdots \times \mathbb{Z}/m_k \mathbb{Z} \\ \bar{a} &\mapsto (\bar{a}_1, \dots, \bar{a}_k) \end{aligned}$$

is a bijection respecting $+$, \times

COROLLARY: $(\mathbb{Z}/(m_1 m_2 \cdots m_k \mathbb{Z}))^\times \cong (\mathbb{Z}/m_1 \mathbb{Z})^\times \times \cdots \times (\mathbb{Z}/m_k \mathbb{Z})^\times$ if $\gcd(m_i, m_j) = 1$
 so if $n = p_1^{e_1} p_2^{e_2} \cdots p_r^{e_r}$ for distinct primes p_i , then $\phi(n) = \phi(p_1^{e_1}) \cdots \phi(p_r^{e_r}) = \prod_{i=1}^r (p_i^{e_i} - p_i^{e_i-1})$.

(70) A digression to describe RSA encryption

Alice wants to be able to have Bob send her secret messages
 (as some $\bar{x} \in \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$), while Eve is eavesdropping (?)

STEP 1:

Alice picks two huge random primes p, q keeping them secret,
 $(\sim 10^{100})$

but then computes $n = p \cdot q$ and publishes n .

She also picks a randomly chosen encryption exponent $e \in (\mathbb{Z}/(p-1)(q-1))^*$,
 and publishes e as an integer in range $1, 2, \dots, (p-1)(q-1)$,
 keeping $(p-1)(q-1)$ secret.

She lastly computes the decryption exponent $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$,
 but keeps it secret.

STEP 2: When Bob wants to send Alice \bar{x} in $\mathbb{Z}/pq\mathbb{Z} = \mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$,
 he computes $\bar{y} := \bar{x}^e$ and sends \bar{y} to Alice publicly instead.

STEP 3: Alice ~~decrypts~~ decrypts \bar{y} by computing

$$\bar{y}^d = (\bar{x}^e)^d = \bar{x}^{de} = \bar{x}^{1+k(p-1)(q-1)} = \bar{x}^1 (\bar{x}^{(p-1)(q-1)})^k = \bar{x} \cdot 1 = \bar{x}$$

for some $k \in \mathbb{Z}$,
 since $d = e^{-1} \pmod{(p-1)(q-1)}$

 (by Euler's Thm,
 since $\phi(n) = \phi(pq)$
 $= (p-1)(q-1)$

10/15/18 >

Crucial points

- Every computation Alice or Bob must do need to be achievable quickly,
 meaning at worst in # of steps at most a polynomial in # of digits of p or q
 ($\log(p), \log(q)$)
 (Math 5248 discusses these computational issues)
- Eve would need to either factor n into $p \cdot q$ (only slow, exponential algorithms known?)
 or compute $\sqrt[n]{\bar{y}} = \bar{x}$ in $\mathbb{Z}/n\mathbb{Z}$ (same story?)